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FIFTH AMENDMENT
Who pays for the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal?
by Michael Peter Waxman
United States of America
V.
Sperry Corporation and Sperry World Trade, Inc.
(Docket No. 88-952)
Argument Date: Oct. 10, 1989
ISSUE
Is Section 502 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
which directs the Federal Reserve Bank to deduct a fixed
percentage from any award in favor of U.S. claimants is-
sued by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, unconstitu-
tional on the ground that it effects a taking of property
without payment of just compensation?
FACTS
Sperry Corporation and Sperry World Trade Inc. (col-
lectively referred to as "Sperry") did business with the Ira-
nian government throughout the 1970s. This business,
consisting of computer systems leases and data process-
ing services, was conducted from the United States as well
as from an office in Tehran.
In response to the seizure of the American Embassy in
Tehran, the capture and hostage-taking of our diplomatic
personnel, and Iran's threat to withdraw its assets from the
United States, the president of the United States declared
a national emergency pursuant to the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act, and issued an Executive Or-
der blocking removal or transfer of "all property and
interests in property of the Government of Iran."
In the ensuing weeks, the U.S. secretary of the treasury
granted a general license authorizing judicial proceedings
(specifically, "pre-judgment attachments") against Iran.
Sperry subsequently withdrew all of its non-Iranian per-
sonnel from Iran and brought suit against Iran seeking $18
million in damages for past-due computer rentals, conver-
sion of assets that Iran allegedly prevented Sperry from
removing, and interference with advantageous business
relationships. On Oct. 24, 1980, Sperry obtained a pre-
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judgment attachment of certain Iranian assets located in
the United States.
On Jan. 19, 1981, both the United States and Iran agreed
to adhere to the 'Algiers Accords." The Algiers Accords
provided for the release of the American hostages, the un-
freezing of Iranian assets in the United States, and the reso-
lution of claims by the nationals of each party against the
government of the other.
The United States, pursuant to the Accords, undertook
to terminate all legal proceedings in U.S. courts involving
claims of U.S. persons and institutions against Iran, and
"to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained
therein." The president's actions to revoke the pre-
judgment attachments pursuant to this understanding were
upheld by the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Re-
gan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
The Accords further provided for the establishment of
an international arbitral tribunal, known as the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, to hear and render "final and bind-
ing" decisions that would be enforceable in the courts of
any nation under its laws. In addition, the United States
agreed to perform various functions and to assign person-
nel to carry out the filing of claims and disbursements. The
Accords provided that "the expenses of the Tribunal shall
be borne equally by the two governments."
Sperry filed a claim against Iran with the Tribunal, seek-
ing payment for the past-due computer rentals, and reim-
bursement for the assets Iran allegedly would not permit
Sperry to remove. Prior to the payment of any of the
Tribunal's awards to U.S. claimants, but after the filing dead-
line for claims, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued
a "directive license" requiring the Federal Reserve Bank
to deduct 2 percent from each award certified by the
Tribunal.
This amount was to be paid into the Treasury "to reim-
burse the United States Government for costs it incurred
for the benefit of U.S. nationals who have claims against
Iran."
Although Sperry and Iran had reached a settlement
agreement before the issuance of the "directive license,"
it was not submitted for acceptance and recording with
the Tribunal until after the directive. When the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York received payment of the Tribunal's
award, it deducted the 2 percent charge.
Sperry brought this suit in U.S. Claims Court to challenge
the deduction as a violation of both the Independent
Offices Appropriations Act (IOAA) and the Fifth Amend-
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ment to the U.S. Constitution. On May 1, 1985, the claims
court rendered an oral decision concluding that the Treas-
ury Department's directive license violated the IOAA.
Congress immediately enacted legislation (Section 502)
that specifically authorized the assessment of a fee (1.5 per-
cent and 1 percent) against successful U.S. claimants be-
fore the Tribunal. The basis for this fee was to reimburse
the U.S. government for the expenses it incurred. The statu-
tory requirement was made retroactive to June 7, 1982 (the
same date on which the Treasury Department had issued
the directive license).
Sperry once again challenged the fee as a violation of
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property will
not be taken for public use "without just compensation."
The claims court agreed with the government that Sperry's
case was moot. In addition, the court rejected Sperry's ar-
gument on the ground that virtually every tax or fee dimin-
ishes the affected property to some extent and that this
diminution does not render Congress' act unconstitutional.
Factors in the claims court's decision included its find-
ings that: (1) the economic impact of the fee was far less
substantial than in many "taking cases"; (2) Congress has
historically authorized fees to reimburse the United States
for the costs of adjudicating and settling claims against for-
eign governments; (3) U.S. nationals doing business abroad
necessarily assume the risk that the president may be re-
quired to exercise his established power to resolve their
claims against a foreign government; and (4) Sperry had
benefited directly from the Tribunal.
The claims court further held that Section 502 did not
contravene the Fifth Amendment's due process clause even
though it was retroactive and imposed a fee on successful
claimants only. Finally, the court found that the fee was
a reimbursement for specific services rendered by the
government rather than a raising of revenue to support the
government generally
Conversely, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals con-
cluded that Section 502 was an unconstitutional taking of
private property without payment of just compensation.
The court of appeals eschewed the traditional multi-factor
test and instead applied a "per se" approach.
It found that Section 502 provides for "seizing a per-
centage of the awards of the Tribunal" to pay "for the reso-
lution of the hostage crisis." Therefore, the government
should pay compensation when it uses private claims as
"bargaining chips" to further the nation's foreign policy
goals.
The court of appeals concentrated on the pre-judgment
attachment awarded to Sperry between the time the Secre-
tary of the Treasury permitted action and the United States
undertook "to terminate all legal proceedings in United
States courts ... [and] to nullify all attachments and judg-
ments obtained therein" as set forth in the Algiers Accords.
The court reasoned that since Sperry already had ob-
tained a pre-judgment attachment, it had had a sufficient
forum and remedy in the district court, and that there were
sufficient assets to cover an eventual award.
Therefore, Sperry neither needed the Tribunal nor
received any benefit from the Algiers Accords. Significantly,
the court of appeals distinguished between this case and
those in which the parties had no other effective recourse
against the foreign government concerned.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Sperry is not the typical government "taking of prop-
erty without just compensation" case. Unlike the cases in
which the government has inappropriately underpaid or
failed to pay a party for the use or abuse of its property,
Sperry requires the Supreme Court to determine whether
the government properly classified the amount of money
it withheld as a "user fee."
Sperry argues that in this case the government's "user
fee" is in reality an appropriation of Sperry's award. There-
fore, since Sperry has not been fully paid, it has a cause
of action against the government under the takings clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Traditionally, when governmental activities must be as-
sessed to see if they so impair private property rights as
to amount to a taking, a court's inquiry is guided by three
factors: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and
(3) the character of the governmental action.
Sperry argued successfully in the court of appeals that
this multi-factor analysis should not be followed when
there is a physical occupation or appropriation of private
property. Instead, a "per se" approach must be followed
that analyzes the occurrence alone with no consideration
of mitigating factors.
The court of appeals regarded the "user fee" deduction
mandated by Section 502 as a permanent "appropriation,"
thereby triggering the per se approach. The court con-
cluded that the government should pay compensation
when it uses private claims as "bargaining chips" to fur-
ther the nation's foreign policy goals. Within this conclu-
sion lies the heart of the issue in the Sperry case.
The unique facts of the Iranian government's hostage-
taking, and the diplomatic netherworld of the United
States-Iran relationship that followed it, form a unique
backdrop for this case.
Unless the Supreme Court wishes to dispose of Sperry
on the technical ground that the Senate's passage of Sec-
tion 502 was an unconstitutional act, either because it was
the improper origination of a "tax" provision (as against
a "user fee") that must originate in the House of Represen-
tatives, or because it denied due process by improperly
directing the retroactive application of a defective adminis-
trative scheme, the Court must wrestle with the nature of
the situation for which the "user fee" was created.
Did the United States permit parties with claims against
the Iranian government to bring their actions in U.S. court,
and to obtain pre-judgment attachments, as part of a
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government plan to use the successful private actions as
"bargaining chips" with which to obtain an overall settle-
ment of the hostage crisis?
If so, did the Senate through Section 502 then create the
"user fee" in order to obtain recompense for the United
States' expenses for the overall crisis (a "taking" in the eyes
of the court of appeals) by taxing the successful Ameri-
can claimants before the Iran-United States Claims Tribu-
nal? Or was the deduction required by Section 502 a "user
fee" for the expenses incurred by the United States for the
maintenance of Claims Tribunal related procedures? Even
if it was exacted solely for the Claims Tribunal costs, does
that remove it from being a "taking"?
Not surprisingly, there are few precedents to assist the
analysis of this situation. Sperry asserts that the govern-
ment's power to suspend or settle claims does not give it
the right to take property without compensation. See
Dames & Moore v Regan. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
Further, it reasons that its case is markedly unlike Shang-
hai Power Co. v United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 237 (1983), aff'd
mem. 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir.), which found no "just com-
pensation clause" violation in the president's settlement
of claims against the People's Republic of China (PRC) on
the ground that the American claimant there had no other
recourse against the PRC. (See also the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1626(b)).
Sperry points out that in the case now before the Court,
the United States first permitted Sperry and the other Iran-
United States Tribunal claimants to sue Iran on their own.
But after their lawsuits met with initial success, the United
States signed the Algiers Accords, which stripped them of
their victories. Thereafter, Sperry and the other claimants
could only use the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to
resolve their disputes.
Then, six months after the final date for filing with the
Tribunal, the U.S. Department of the Treasury established
the "directive license" that would become the forerunner
to Section 502's "user fee."
The impact of the Sperry decision may be far greater
than the vast sums (plus interest) the government withheld
under the Treasury Department's "directive license." This
case may affect the ability of the government to enter into
international dispute resolution mechanisms.
A decision against the government may require it to care-
fully assess the costs involved in the creation and main-
tenance of any such mechanism that is proposed in the
future. Further, assuming the government has the power
to deny access to other domestic dispute resolution
mechanisms, affected parties might have grounds for claim-
ing that the assessment of costs is a "taking" even with
advance notice.
While on the one hand it might seem that the govern-
ment could be unfairly charging successful applicants such
as Sperry, the Court may well have to consider whether,
in the heat of a world crisis, it is appropriate to leave the
ability to effect an equitable resolution of claims, much
less their payment, to domestic courts.
ARGUMENTS
For the United States of America (Counsel of Record,
John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, Department
of Justice, Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202)
633-2217):
1. In order to reimburse the U.S. government for its costs
in connection with the arbitration and payment of
claims against Iran, Congress had the constitutional
authority to impose a fee on U.S. claimants who receive
an award from the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
For Sperry Corporation and Sperry World Trade,
Inc (Counsel of Record, John D. Seiver, 1919 Pennsylva-
nia Ave. N.W, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20006; tele-
phone (202) 659-9750):
1. The Iran Claims Settlement Act violates the takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment because it legislatively
imposes the costs of settling the hostage crisis on those
American nationals whose commercial claims against
Iran were suspended in exchange for the release of the
hostages.
2. The Iran Claims Settlement Act is void under the due
process and origination clauses as well.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Sperry Corporation
The Chevron Corporation and the Pacific Legal
Foundation.
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